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Introduction
Few topics in labor economics have been ns widely studied as the
minimum wage. Arecent survey of the literature (Brown et al 1982) has 111
citations on the topic. Most of these studies have attempted to measure the
impact of raising the minimum wage on employment, unemployment or labor
force participation. Estimates of minimum wage effects have been obtained
for the aggregate economy as well as disaggregated by age, race, sex, and
industry. Acommon finding is that the adverse impacts of minimum wages on
employment are most severe for younger cohorts, and particularly for young
blacks. On the other hand, more skilled workers are not hurt and may even
gain from minimum wages,^
Acommon explanation for the differential impacts of minimum wages on
various demographic groups is that these groups differ in their average
level of embodied human capital. Presumably the groups most adversely
affected by minimum wages will be those whose skill levels are lowest on
average. Thus the young, who have relatively low levels of both education
and on-the-job training, will be the most likely to lose job opportunities
while more highly skilled workers may gain employment opportunities through
substitution effects.
A second connection between human capital and the minimum wage is
through the opportunity for on-the-job training. Since minimum wages
increase the costs of training for firms, it is commonly hypothesized that
firms will cut back on training when minimum wages are increased. Therefore
2
some of the gains of minimum wages are reversed through slower wage growth. .
The lower opportunity for employer financial training coupled with reduced
job opportunities may induce members of the low skilled demographic groups
to seek self-financed training through vocational, junior college or college
. . 3
opportunities,
This paper examines the entry-level occupational and educational
decisions of successive cohorts of high school graduates. It seeks to
answer several questions that have not been adequately addressed in the
literature. First, we study whether changes in minimum wages alter the mix
of occupational entry decisions. Previous studies have not considered the
distributional impacts of minimum wages on occupational choice. Second, we
investigate the extent to which minimum wages increase the incentive to seek
post—secondary education. Our inclusion of vocational and junior college
training is, to our knowledge, unique to our study. Third, we determine
whether differences in endowments, of school quality or family inputs into
human capital production and the resulting heterogeneity in skills result in
differential impacts of minimum wagesj
The study makes use of an explicit model of occupational choice under
uncertainty. An agent decides which occupation or training option to
select, given knowledge of his current level of human capital, the moments
of the distribution of earnings per unit of human capital in all occupations
and education categories, and the level and coverage of the minimum wages
across all occupations. By specifying the form of the utility function, we
are able to derive structural occupational supply equations that allow us to
extract the impact of minimum wage policy on occupational choice.
Occupational decisions should reflect the agent's perceptions of the effects
of minimum wages on on-the-job training opportunities, the distribution of
earnings per unit of human capital and on the length of job search.
Therefore, we may implicitly obtain estimates of these effects by observing
how the distribution of occupational choice varies in response to changes in
the minimum wage in the context of our structural model.
Model
We assume that agents live for two periods. In the first period, the
agent specializes in production of human capital. In the second period, the
individual initially accumulates on-the-job training or other occupation-
specific training such as education or vocational training and then works
full time in the occupation for the remainder of the period. In this study,
we treat the college or vocational training choice as if they were
occupational choices. For this reason, we use the more general term
"activities" to represent the range of occupational or educational choices
available^to individuals who have just completed high school.
Life earnings from each activity are not known with certainty, but the
moments of the distribution of earnings are known. At the beginning of
period two, the agent decides which activity to choose so as to maximize
lifetime expected utility, based on human capital accumulated in period one
and the training opportunities and the earnings distributions across all
activities. The minimum wage alters the probability of choosing an activity
through its impact on the wage distribution, on the waiting time to obtain a
job in the occupation and on the on-the-job training opportunities in the
occupation.
At the end of period one, an individual has an endowment of human
capital obtained in school. This stock of human capital may not be equally
applicable to all activities, so we designate activity i specific human
capital as hp The individual also has an endowment of wealth from period
one equal to Y .
In period 2, the individual selects an activity. The activity will
further endow the individual with activity-specific human capital h^j^, which
represents on-the-job training or education associated with activity i.
Earnings in the activity are determined by the individual's stock of human
capital h^ =h^. + and the earnings per unit of human capital, W^. The
individual uses his period 2 earnings along with his wealth carried over
from period one to purchase consumer goods in period 2. In the absence of
any bequest motive, the individual sets consumption in period 2, equal
to total income available in activity i in period 2, Wj^h^ +
If earnings per unit of human capital are known with certainty, the
individual chooses activity i so as to maximize lifetime earnings and thus
lifetime utility. In general, earnings in activity i will not be known with
certainty. Future labor demand and supply conditions are unknown, as are
future hours of work available in the activity. Finally, the individual
will not know his degree of luck or success in the activity. This implies
that, while the individual can observe the distribution of earnings in the
activity, the individual cannot know with certainty where he will end up in
that distribution,
• The individual's choice is therefore to choose an activity so as to
maximize expected utility in period 2, given knowledge of his stock of
activity-specific human capital produced in period 1, the availability of
further human capital accumulation in period 2 and the distribution of
earnings per unit of human capital. The choice may be written
(1) maximize e(Uj^(C2j^)} = E + Wj|^ hj.)
Minimum wages affect the expected utility of selecting an activity in
three ways. First, minimum wages may alter the distribution of earnings per
unit of human capital in the activity. We cannot predict a priori the
direction of change in the moments of the distribution of earnings in the
activity. Some workers will work longer hours and others will work shorter
hours as "firms adjust their skill-specific labor demand to the presence of
minimum wages. To the extent that spillover from the covered to the
uncovered sectors of the occupation occurs, wages in the uncovered sector of
the occupation will be depressed as minimum wages in the covered sector are
increased.
Asecond effect is that minimum wages may alter the amount of on-the-
job training available in an occupation. To the extent that minimum wages
increase the firm's costs of providing training, firms will reduce their
investment in the human capital of their employees.^ This lowers the amount
of available in the occupation, lowering the lifetime human capital h.
and lifetime earnings Wj^h^^ in the occupation.
The third effect of minimum wages on expected utility is to alter the
waiting time or search costs associated with finding a job in activity i.
If new entrants must wait for premium jobs in a given occupation, minimum
wages may alter the length of waiting time. Minimum wages may also
establish queues for jobs in the covered sector relative to the uncovered
sector. New entrants into the occupation may "wait" in the uncovered sector
for openings to develop in the covered sector.
The standard argument is that increasing the minimum wage increases the
length of the queue. In fact, the effect of minimum wages is more complex
and depends upon the level of human capital embodied in the job entrant. If
the job entrant has a high level of skill relative to the minimum wage (due
perhaps to high quality schooling or high levels of household investment in
human capital in period 1), minimum wages will not lengthen and may shorten
. the individual's queuing time as employers substitute toward higher skill
applicants and away from lower skilled applicants. On the other hand, if
the job entrant has a low skill level relative to the minimum wage, the
person's queuing time will lengthen. In other words, we posit that for an
individual with human capital length of qtieue, q^, will fall as the
minimuin wage, , increases until the minimum wage equals the marginal
product associated with bj^^. Thereafter, we expect that the individual's
waiting time will increase as the gap between the minimum wage and the
Individuals marginal product rises. This relationship is illustrated in
Figure 1.
Adding the effects of minimum wages to (1), we have
(2) maximize e{Uj. Yj^+Wj^(MWj^)hj^(MW^), qj^(MWj^)
Equation (2) represents the expected utility from consumption in activity i,
taking into account the disutility from waiting in queues associated with
occupation i.
In order to make the theory empirically tractable and thus derive
explicit empirical measures of the effects of minimum wages on activity
choice, it is necessary to impose additional structure on equation (2). We
assume an exponential utility function of the form,
(3) - <f)qj^ - 3 exp(-YW^hj^ - Y^)
Where X. is a vector of variables measuring the hedonic attributes of
activity i, « is a vector of taste parameters associated with these hedonic
attributes, is a taste parameter for waiting time, 3 is a taste parameter
for consumption and Y is a measure of absolute risk aversion. p and y are
assumed to be positive. The individual is assumed to know q^, h., and Y^
Equation (3) has several intuitively appealing implications. It is a
monotonically increasing concave function in consumption. Utility
asymptotically approaches the individual's tastes for activity
i, as W^ approaches infinity. Individuals facing the same wage
distribution with certainty, but he knows only the distribution of
FIGURE 1
MW.
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is the length of an applicant's queue form covered sector jobs in
occupation i. MW^ is the minimum wage in occupation i, hj^. is the
applicant's human capital, measured in terms of his marginal productivity,
may choose different activities due to heterogeneity in activity-specific
skills, wealth, degree of risk aversion or tastes for the occupation.
Heterogeneity in taste becomes more important in explaining activity choice
as the degree of risk aversion rises, as wealth rises, as the taste for
consumption falls and as human capital falls. In the limit, activity choice
will depend only on taste as either or y approaches infinity and as
either h. or 0 equals zero. In other words, agents who base their activity
choice solely on taste will be those who are extremely wealthy or extremely
risk averse, or those who have no marketable skills or those who derive no
utility from consumption.
Because the individual knows Yp and and with certainty, we can
take the expectation of as
• (4) E(U^) = <|)qj^ + E[-0j^exp(-YWj^hj^)
where 3 = 3 exp and E is the expectation operator. We can
approximate the expected utility from activity i by taking a MacLaurin
series expansion about Yh . Assuming that the distribution of has at
1
least m moments, we have
m (-Yh.)^
(5) E(U^) = - pj - 3i E 1,1^- ^i ^l^i
is the error of our approximation. Equation (5) shows that the expected
utility from selecting activity i depends on the hedonic characteristics of
activity i and on the mmoments of the earnings distribution of occupation
i, E(W.), E(W?), E(W?). The first moment of the distribution will
increase expected utility. The second moment of the distribution will
decrease expected utility, A positive (negative) third moment will increase
(decrease) expected utility.
The probability of selecting activity i over another activity n depends
upon the relative expected utility of selecting the activities. This
probability may be written
(6) P. = P [e(U.) > E(U )
1 r'^ 1 n
m (-Yh.)'' . k ,
--Ti—
k=l
To derive an estimable form of (6), it is necessary to specify the
distribution of the error terms and It is convenient to assume that
these random variables have independent Weibull distributions. This allows
us to derive equations for n-1 equations which show the logarithm of the
odds of selecting an activity over an arbitrary n'^ ^ activity. The equation
is
(^) =^ [^ t^; cx.x„) -
^n k=l
for i = 1, 2, 3, ...., n-l.
Although the individual knows h., X. and q.m these are not directly
JL ^ ^
observable by the econometrician. We must therefore posit some underlying
functional relationship between these unobservables and sorae measurable
instruments including the minimum wage. We approximate the
activity-specific human capital aa^
(8) h. = 62^1.1 + 53iMW.
where is a measure of school quality in period one and is a measure of
household inputs into human capital in period one, Sj^ and control for
10
human capital production in period 1. The minimum wage MW is a control for
human capital production in period 2. If minimx.m wages reduce a firm's
incentive to provide on-the-job training, then increasing the minimum wage
in activity i should reduce activity i specific human capital.
Waiting time for premium jobs or covered sector jobs in activity i is
also a function of the minimum wage. In our formulation,
(9)- q. = TToi +
As argued above, we cannot sign if without knowledge of the level of skill
relative to the level of the minimum wage.
The hedonic factors are not observed directly. However, such
factors are unlikely to change rapidly over time. To the extent that these
hedonic characteristics are time invariant, their effects are captured by
the constant term in the regression. We may also have variation in tastes
for activities across geographic areas. These differences in tastes are
captured by a vector of county-specific dummy variables, Other possible
proxies for variation in taste such as sex, years of education, or age are
not relevant to this study since our sample holds all these factors fixed.
In general, we may estimate equation (7) with any number of moments of
the distribution of earnings per unit of human capital. In applications, it
becomes impossible to extend the approximation very far. The problem is
that each added moment of the earnings distribution requires that we add the
corresponding higher-order moment of the human capital production process as
well. Using even the simple form in equation (8) involves four interaction
terms with the first moment of the earnings distribution, ten interaction
terms with the second moment, 20 interaction terms with the third moment and
so on. As higher order moments of the distribution are admitted to the
11
equation, problems of multicollinearity become increasingly severe,
eventually leading to an uninvertable moment matrix of the regressors. For
this reason, we constrained our estimation to include only the first two
moments of the earnings distribution.
Data
We estimate equation 7 by utilizing a unique and rich set of data.
Each year between 1951 and 1969 the Maryland State Board of Education has
published data (in the Annual Report) on the number of high school graduates
broken down by sex and by their major type of activity in the year following
8 • •graduation. This survey categorized graduates into those who continued
their education in 2 Year Schools (Junior colleges, Vocational schools; Art,
music, and drama schools) or in 4 Year Schools (Universities; State teachers
colleges), or who took jobs broken down into six occupational groups
(Farming, Fishing, and Lumbering; Operatives and Laborers; Service Workers;
Craftsmen; Clerical and Sales; Professionals and Managers), and an "Other"
group who were not enrolled or employed (at home; miscellaneous).
Our dependent variable is measured as the logarithm of the number of
persons in each activity group i divided by the number in the Farmer/Farm
Laborer group. We have eight activities and dependent variables for men
(two enrollment categories, five occupational employment categories, and the
"Other"' group) but only seven for women (one less occupation as discussed
later in this paper). Farming was used as the reference group because there
were very few instances in which no one entered the farming occupation.
This was computationally convenient because we did not then have to worry
about dividing by zero^ The problem of taking the log of zero still
remained in some instances when there were no graduates taking jobs in an
12
occupation. In such cases, we set the numerator's zero value to equal to
0.1.^^ Descriptive statistics for the variables used in our regression
analysis for males are summarized in Table I.
The measure of school quality (S) used in this study is the real value
of instructional salaries per student enrolled, weighted by a school
utilization ratio. To be more specific, we divided "Salaries and Wages for
Instruction at the Secondary Level" by the number o£ students enrolled in
the school district and then expressed it in constant dollars. This value
was multiplied by the attendance rate . In order to take account of the
fact that a student's schooling investment occurred over several years, a
six-year moving average was computed.
A measure of average "family" wealth (ll), which is used to control for
home inputs into educational production, is also available from the Maryland
State Board of Education. The Board reports the total value of property
other than corporate or railroad property which is assessable for tax
purposes by county level school district. We compute a six-year moving
12
average of real property values per capita as our proxy for "A".
We used national income data from the U.S. Bureau of the Census [Series
P-60] to develop our measures of the distribution of earnings by occupation
and schooling. Income distributions by discrete intervals have been
published annually for males and females by major occupation and by level of
educational attainment. From these distributions, we estimated the annual
mean and the second moment of income (each expressed in real terms) for each
of our six occupational groupings and for persons completing 1-3 years of
13college and 4 or more years of college.
Unfortunately, these Census Bureau data do not hold constant the level
13
TABLE I
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR MALES
Dependent Variable: LogCP^/Pp)
Pro fe s 8ionaIs/Managers
Clerical/Sales
Craftsmen
Operatives/Laborers
Service
1-3 Year Schools
4 Year Schools
Other (Unemployed)
Differences In Income Means (li -M )
i F
Professionals/Managers
Clerical/Sales
Craftsmen
Operatives/Laborers
Service
1-3 Year Schools
4 Year Schools
Other (Unemployed)
Differences in Income Second Moments (cfj_-Op)
Professionals/Managers
Clerical/Sales
Craftsmen
Operatives/Laborers
Service
1-3 Year Schools
4 Year Schools
Other (Unemployed)
Mean
•2.309
.090
-.678
.772
-1.556
-.723
4.433
-.138
,459
.213
.215
.094
.023
.175
.366
.554
,601
,127
,074
,055
,134
.080
.384
.380
School Quality (S)
Assets (H)
Mlniumum Wage Index (MW^-MWp)
Professional/Managers
Clerical/Sales
Craftsmen
Operative/Laorers
Service
1-3 Year Schools
4 Year Schools
Other (Unemployment)
253.473
1.869
.187
.163
.213
.248
.106
.187
.187
.187
Standard Deviation
2.011
1.385
1.587
1.294
1.795
1.568
1.419
1.509
.081
.064
.074
.069
.077
.075
.110
.123
.147
.098
.125
.131
.142
.085
.161
.185
67.368
.661
.059
.067
.068
.071
.050
.059
.059
.059
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of human capital within an occupation. As a consequence, an increase in the
proportion who are college educated will tend to alter the published
distribution of income, even though high school graduates taking jobs may
have experienced no change in their actual income distribution. The method
of purging the occupational income distribution data of educational
attainment effects was to regress the logarithm of income on the logarithm
of education, for each moment of their respective distributions. The
anti-logarithm of the residuals from such a regression should yield the
14 . .
corresponding income moment purged of the education effect, A similar
procedure was used in purging the means and second moments of earnings for
those completing 1"*3 years and 4+ years of college of age effects. That is,
the moments were computed for persons age 25-64 and these moments were
regressed'on corresponding momenta of the age distribution for college
educated workers. Again, the anti-log of the residuals was utilized.
This procedure yielded eight time series, each of which around a mean
of 1,0, Information on the mean and second moment of income for each
occupation for high school graduates and for persons having completed some
or 4 years of college was obtained from the 1950, 1960, and 1970 Census of
Population, These data were used to establish the relative rankings of the
eight categories in those years. Trends were built back into the series
using the 1950, 1960, 1970 relative values as benchmarks,Finally, we
constructed a simple two-year moving average of the occupational means and
second moments. This adjusts for the fact that high school graduates in
1951, for instance, are observed in their occupational and schooling
pursuits in late 1951 and early 1952..^^
Our minimum wage index is closely patterned after the index which is
15
widely used in the minimum wage literature. Unfortunately, coverage data
are not available by occupation. As a result, we approximated an occupation
specific index by using the distribution of occupational employment across
industries as our weights. ' To be precise, our index was computed as:
(10) =
where j indexes occupation, i indexes industry, t indexes the year, m
indexes newly covered workers, p indexes previously covered workers, Mis
the minimum wage, Wis the average industry wage, C is the proportion
covered, and E is employment of 18-19 year olds in 1960. During 1961-1964
and 1967-1969 different minimum wage rates were in effect for newly covered
workers and for those who were covered prior to the amendments of 1961 and
1967, National data on coverage and on average wage rates were used rather
than data for Maryland alone. This is consistent with our use of nationwide
data in estimating the means and second moments of the earnings
distribution. National data were used, in part, due to data limitations for
Maryland and, in part, due to the view that a national job market is not
implausible for young, mobile high school graduates. National data may also
be interpreted as an instrumental variable for local labor market measures.
Since the minimum wage variable is a key variable in this study, some
comparisons between Maryland and the U.S. are appropriate. We have
sufficient data to estimate the proportion of all non-supervisory workers
(excluding government and domestic workers) who were covered by the law for
18
both Maryland and the U.S.,in three years 1964, 1967, and 1969. These
"proportions are reported at the top of Table II and are virtually identical.
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TABLE II
COMPARISON OF MARYLAND AND U.S. MINIMUM WAGE
COVERAGE DURING SELECTED YEARS OF THE 1960's
Proportion of Non-supervisory Employees
(Exc. Government* and Domestic Workers)
Covered by Federal Minimum Wage
U.S Maryland
1964 .660 ,664
1967 .790 .779
1969 .818 .813
*Non-supervi8ory employees are not available
for government and hence could not be included
None were covered until 1967. Domestics were
never covered until 1974.
INDUSTRIAL DISTRIBUTION OF EMPLOYEES COVERED BY THE
FEDERAL MINIMUM WAGE LAW
1964 1967
U.S. Maryland U.S. Marylai
Agriculture, Forest, Fishing .000 .000 .012 .007
Mining .019 .004 .013 .003
Construction .082 .116 .079 .111
Manufacturing .514 .464 .419 .368
Transportation, Communications,
and Utilities .117 .124 .093 .095
Wholesale Trade .071 .064 .058 .050
Retail Trade .088 .116 .105 .129
Finance, Insurance and
Real Estate .063 .066 .049 .055
Service (excluding domestics) .047 .046 .112 .103
Government .000 .000 .060 .079
TOTAL 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Source: Published and unpublished data supplied by U.S. Wage and Hour and
Public Contracts Division, U.S. Department of Labor.
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More detailed data are available by industry coverage for 196A and 1967.
since total non-supervisory employment is not available by individual
industry for Maryland, we can only report the distributions of covered
workers across industries. These comparisons are available at the bottom of
Table II. The Fair Labor Standards Act covered slightly more workers in
Maryland in construction, retail trade, and government and slightly fewer
workers in manufacturing than was true nationally. But overall, the
distributions are very similar. We conclude that the use of national
coverage data is reasonable for Maryland,
It is more difficult to judge the suitability of using national average
industry wage rates in computing our minimum wage index. Unfortunately the
U,S, Bureau of Labor Statistics only publishes manufacturing wage rates for
Maryland.' One other industry series is available, average wages for hired
farm labor in Maryland, from the U.S, Department of Agriculture, These wage
rates are compared in Table III. Aside from some relative increase in
Maryland manufacturing wage rates in the early 1950*8, this series has been
essentially identical in the U.S. and Maryland, Relative farm wage rates
have varied more, with Maryland rates rising somewhat in the early 1950's
and falling in the 1960'8, Since agriculture was not covered until 1967,
these differences should have little impact on our index. Although the
evidence is limited, manufacturing wage rates suggest that national data
should be a good proxy for Maryland.
Most Professional and Managerial employees have not been covered by the
minimum wage law. Interpreted literally, the minimum wage index should be
zero for this occupation as well as for the 2 year and 4 year school groups
and for the "Other" category (those not enrolled and not employed). In
18
TABLE III
AVERAGE WAGE RATES IN MARYLAND AND THE U.S. BY MANUFACTURING AND
AGRICULTURE FOR SECOND YEARS 1951-1969
MANUFACTURING AGRICULTURE
Maryland Maryland
U.S. Maryland U.S. U.S. Maryland U.S.
1951 $1.56 $1.47 .942 $ .77 $ .80
1.039
1953 1.74 1.66 .954 .B2 .87
1.061
1955 1.85 1.82 .984 .82
.90 1.098
1957 2.04 2.06 1.010 .88 .94
1.068
1959 2.19 2.20 1.005 .95
1.01 1.063
1961 2.32 2.34 1.009 .99 1.04
1.051
1963 2.45 2.48 1.012 1.05 1.07
1.019
1965 2.61 2.62 1.004 1.14 1.14
1.009
1967 2.82 2.82 1.000 1.33 1.27
.955
1969 3.19 3.22 1.009 1.55 1.50
.968
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment and Earnings
U.S, Department of Agriculture, Farm Labor
19
addition, farm workers were not covered until 1967 so their index is zero
1951-1966. Even after 1967, only a minority of farm laborers (on large
farms) were covered. Since farming is our base or reference group, the
(MW^-MW^^^^) index would be essentially zero for these four categories and
we could not estimate any impact of minimum wages on Professional/Managers,
School enrollment, or on the "Other" category. This would be unfortunate in
that one of our major objectives was to determine whether youths who are
displaced from employment by minimum wages, spill over into these
alternative activities.
Our theoretical analysis suggests another approach. The notion that
the length of the queue (q) is important implies that some young people who
discover that the length of the queue for operative jobs in factories has
lengthened may go to vocational school to invest in more human capital or
may take managerial jobs (in small businesses) to avoid the law or may.
remain at home. All of these strategies may be interpreted more broadly as
"waiting time" strategies. That is, youths, may enter these alternative
states while waiting for jobs to open up in the covered occupations. (Of
course, they may also "wait" in lower paying not-covered operative—or
other—jobs until higher paying covered operative—or other—jobs become
available.) This suggests that it is appropriate to include a minimum wage
variable in our Professional/Managerial, Schooling, and "Other" equations.
An index averaged over all industries and occupations seems most relevant
and was employed in our initial estimates. The sensitivity of this approach
to alternative specifications is discussed below.
20
Zellner "Seemingly Unrelated" Regrcseiona for Malee
A. Queuing Effects
In this section, we report our estimates of a simplified version of
equations 7-9. If we modify Equation 8 by imposing that the human capital
production parameters are equal across activities, by excluding the on-the-
job training effects of minimum wages (so h 6^ + 6j ^ ^2
limiting the system to the first two moments, then we obtain equation 11:
2
(11) log ^ ^ ^
n
- - Y^SiSjSllIo.-o^]
2 _ ,2 , -(K.-X„) _
- h - h «2" 'T-'n' ^ S ^ ^ i
where u- -and represent the first and second moments of the wage distribu
tion of activity i respectively, and e is the approximation error due to
the missing higher order moments of the human capital production function
and the wage distribution. In theory, more general activity equations may
be derived by admitting higher order moments of tlie earnings distribution
and the production functions. In practice, however, as higher order moments
of these functions are added, problems of mul ticol 1ineanty become severe.
Because of the possibility of contemporaneous correlation between the
errors of the eight activity equations, equation (11) was estimated using
Zellner's seemingly unrelated regression technique. A set of county dummy
variables was added to each equation in order to control for county specific
effects. These dummy variables help to control for time invariant taste
differences and costs of job entry across counties and across activities.
Other typical controls for taste such as sex, age, education, or region of
21
the country are unnecessary in this application since these characteristics
are uniform across individuals in the sample.
In addition, the minimum wage variable is interacted with school inputs
(S) and home inputs (H) respectively. In our theory, we noted that a youth
may face a shorter queue when tlie minimum wage rises if the value of his,
productivity exceeded the minimum wage. This is more likely for youths who
attend higher quality high schools and who accumulate more human capital at
home. Hence, minimum wages should have a positive impact on choice of most
activities when interacted with S and H,
The results as reported in Table IV are quite good in general, with a
weighted of .548. Magnitudes of the regression coefficients and
associated t-statistics are given at the top of the table. The pattern of
coefficients is reasonably consistent across equations. Technically, we
could use equation (11) to reclaim the structural parameters. However,
because of the complexity of the interaction terms, the estimated
coefficients are easier to intierpret if we compute the regression slopes
(i.e., the first derivatives of the dependent variables with respect to each
of the independent variables). For instance, the derivative with respect to
mean income (p.-y^) is reported in the first row below the dashed line of
1 f
Table IV, If we look back to equation (11), we see that this derivative
equals .y(6q + + ^2^^ which is the level of human capital embodied in the
worker multiplied by the measure of constant absolute risk aversion. This
term should be positive if agents are risk averse. Similarly, the
derivative with respect to the second moment of the wage distribution equals
2h*2
- -^--2— which must be negative if agents are risk averse. The derivatives
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with respect to school and home inputs are " Y ^
Y6^(y.-p^) - Y^6 2h*(a^-ajj) respectively, neither of which may be signed.
The derivative with respect to minimum wages is -(<})Trj^)/3 plus the
coefficients of the interaction terms times S and II respectively. This
derivative can not be signed, in general, since the sign of is
indeterminate. All of these derivatives were evaluated at the sample means
of the variables. Each of these slopes may be interpreted as the impact of
a unit increase in the independent variable on the log odds of choosing
occupation i relative to farming. Asymptotic t-statistics are shown in
parentheses below each slope.
As expected, an increase in mean income increases the likelihood of
being in that activity. The slope with respect to is positive in
all eight cases and is statistically significant (using standard criteria)
for six of eight activities. The impact on selection of operative/labor and
service jobs are not significant,
F—tests of joint hypotheses across all five equations were computed and
reported at the bottom of Table XV, The first testa whether the three terms
per equation which contain mean income are jointly zero across all
equations. This test is of interest in that a variable may be an important
determinant of choice of activity and yet happen to have a near-zero slope
when evaluated at the sample means, due to nonlinearities, The test
statistic (F-2.86) allows us to reject the hypothesis that mean income
differentials do not matter.
The derivatives with respect to the second moment of income are also
reported in Table IV, Seven of the eight slopes are negative as expected
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TABLE IV
MALES: ZELLNER REGRESSIONS CONTROLLING FOR INCOME MOMENTS AND ASSETS
Profes
sionals Clerical Operatives 1~3 4
and and and Year Year
Managers Sales Craftsmen Laborers Service Schools Schools Other
jip)
S*(o£-ap)
; (S)^*(a£-ap)
• H*(n£-ap)
H-^*(a£-ap)
(S)*H*(a£-(Jp)
(MWj^-MWp)
(S)*(MW£-MWp)
22.7 11.21 16.70 2.36 -21.47 6.96 .99
(1.88)* (1.65)* (1.84)* (.30) (1.57) (2.24)** (.43)
-.10 -.02 -.02 -.01 .15 -.01 -.10
(1.69)* (.79) (.69) (.23) (2.34)** (1.45) (.72)
6.68 -.03 1.13 -.03 -3.91 .93 1.69
(1.50) (.02) (.52) (.01) (.69) (1.12) (1.88)*
-11.54 -35.41 --18.93 2.07 35.20 -31.81 -2.67
(1.31) (2.46)** (1.05) (.16) (1.74)* (3.61)*** (1.18)
.003 .27 .16 -.04 -.28 .11 -.002
(.09) (2.37)** (1.25) (.50) (2.22)** (1.39) (.18)
31.19
(4.08)***
-.10
(3.18)***
2.12
(.81)
-36.81
(3.10)***
.16
(2.44)**
~41.5xl0"^-6.2xl0 ^-4.7x10"^ .6x10"^ 4.3xl0"^ -.8x10"^ .4x10"^ -1.2x10
(1.57) (2.16)** (1.71)* (.38) (2.16)** (.37) (1.04) (1.49)
-.48
(.18)
-7.46
(1.32)
-10.39 5.19 9.34 10.78 1.36 -2.90
(1.53) (1.02) (1.08) (2.22)** (1.65)* (.64)
(H)*(MWi-MWp)
County Dununies
Intercept
-.57 -.14 .30 -.56 .27 -.88 -.57 -.17
(.90) (.13) (.30) . (1.08) (.35) (.62) (2.49)** (.59)
-.003 .03 .04 -.004 -.03 -.02 .00 .005
(.31) (1.19) (1.39) (.27) (1.59) (.83) (.08) (.64)
-11.48 -8.81 -1.67 -11.58 -.25 -11.90 -9.02 1.24
(1.56) (1.95)* (.31) (3.05)*** (.02) (2.74)*** (3.49)*** (.18)
.04 .04 .03 .04 -.02 .04 .03 -.02
(1.17) (1.88)* (1.45) (2.59)*** (.AO) (3.02)*** (2.81)*** (.79)
-.24 -.13 -.51 .93 3.66 1.32 1.00 2.81
(.08) (.09) (.33) (.95) (1.69)* (1.16) (1.38) (1.42)
Inc. Inc. Inc. Inc. Inc. Inc. Inc. Inc,
-5.03 -1.36 -4.56 .21
(5.27)***(2.42)** (4.87)*** (.31)
-3.23 -1.93 .02 2.11
(4.61)***(3.30)*** (.05) (1.65)*
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TABLE IV (Continued)
MALES: ZELLNER REGRESSIONS CONTROLLING FOR INCOME MOMENTS AND ASSETS
Profes
sionals Clerical Operatives 1-3 4
and and and Year Year
Managers Sales Craftsmen Laborers Service Schools Schools Other
Estimated Derivatives:
3Z
3Z
TToT^op"
dz
•?H
az
•3W
8 Z
TCW.-MWp)
11.05 6.64 13.26 .42 8.00 4.89 1.84 10.57
(2.58)***(2.08)** (3.20)*** (.13) (1.48) (3.12)*** (2.75)*** (2.06)**
-5.43 -5.73 -9.87 .69 -2.39 -4.34 -.32 -7.43
(1.99)** (1.98)** (2.67)*** (.25) (.51) (3.44)*** (.67) (1.75)**
.97 -.09
(2.01)** (.37)
-.11
(.38)
.18
(.84)
.28
(.91)
.65
(2.56)**
.52
(3.46)***
.24
(.82)
.0053 .0096 .0053
(1.61) (4.03)***(1.73)*
.0085 .0049
(3.46)***(1.29)
.0081
(3.11)***
.0082
(7.48)***
.0098
(3.41)***
-1.92 -.13 4.79 -.90 2.71 1.05 -.30 .87
(.90) (.10) (2.79)*** (.70) (1.06) (.58) (.37) (.44)
^oint Summary Statistics:
Weighted R^ = .548
. • F-test for (p£-lip)
F-test for (o^-op)
F-test for H
F-test for S
F-test for (MW^-MWp)
2.86***
2.76***
1.60**
2.32***
4.53***
Dependent variable: Z = log odds of selecting occupation i over farming
(t-statistics in parentheses)
* significant at 10% level
** significant at 5% level
*** significant at 1% level
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and five of eight are significant. The major anomaly occurs in the
operataive/laborer occupation, which is positive but not significant. The
F-test for the joint significance of all terms across equations
(F=2,76) allows us to reject the hypothesis that the second^moment does not
matter. We take these results as strong evidence that choice of activity is
subject to uncertainty and that higher order moments of the wage
distribution enter an agent's decision process.
Partial effects with respect to assets and school quality were also
computed. All of these slopes except two were positive. The anomalies
occur in the clerical/sales and crafts occupations for home inputs. Three
of the asset slopes and five out of eight school quality slopes were
statistically significant. The F-tests show that the joint hypothesis that
school quality and home inputs do not enter the activity choice decision
(i.e., the hypothesis that 6^^ = 0 and ^2 " 0 in equations respectively)
can be rejected.
These results suggest that heterogeneity in human capital production
due to differences in school quality does affect clioice of activity. In
particular, the increased human capital production in higher quality schools
induces greater entry into other occupations and into post high school
training relative to farming. In addition, there is evidence that human
capital produced as a result of higher family assets increases the
probability of choosing the professional/managerial occupation and of
entering post high school training. Because S and H do not have uniform
effects on choice of activity, these results lead to the speculation that
school and home inputs into human capital production may have
- . . 19
occupation-specific as well as general training components.
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The set of 22 county dummy variables were jointly significant for each
of the activities. Although not shown in Table IV, the orderings of the
individual county dummies were quite consistent across activity groups. As
one would expect, most young men enter nonagricultural occupations and enter
college in the suburban Anne Arundel, Baltimore, Montgomery, and Prince
George's counties. Young men are more likely to enter agriculture in the
rural Garret, Kent, and Queen Anne's counties.
We are most interested in the impact of the minimum wage variable. As u
discussed above, our theory does not yield clear predictions as to the signs
of the coefficients involving T( However, our results have reasonable
interpretations, with some exceptions.
The individual regression coefficients for MW are negative in seven out
of eight cases and significant in four cases. This is quite reasonable for
the occupational choice equations in the sense that previous studies have
found that higher minimum wage rates and coverage decrease teenage
employment. It is particularly notable that the operative/laborers grows is
significantly negative. The positive coefficient (1.24) for the "Other"
category is also reasonable if we interpret this group of youths (who
reported "At Home" and Miscellaneous" activities) as primarily being
unemployed. Harder to understand are the negative and significant
coefficients on MW for the 2 Year and A Year school categories. We would
have expected positive signs in these regressions, in the sense that higher
minimum wages should induce youths to enter vocational schools to overcome
the employment barriers created by the law. On the other hand, it is
possible that those more able youths who otherwise would have gone to
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vocational school find that they are more in demand (relative to less able
youths, such as high school dropouts) and decide to take a job rather than
continue in school.
The interaction term with school quality (S*MW) has a positive sign six
out of eight times. As predicted, higher quality schools allow their
graduates to move up in the queue and take jobs in four of the five
occupations. The negative, insignificant coefficient for the "Other"
category is also reasonable. The 2 Year and 4 Year School categories have
positive and significant coefficients, although it is less clear what sign
should be expected.
The interaction terms with home inputs (ll '^MW) yielded mixed results.
Five coefficients are positive and three are negative. None are significant
at the 5%'level. The positive coefficients for 2 Year Schools, 4 Year
Schools, and the "Other" category may be interpreted as indicating that
youths from higher income families can better afford to enter these
activities when minimum wages rise.
The derivatives with respect to each minimum wage index are also
reported in Table IV. .Three of five occupations have negative slopes,
although none is significant. The large positive and significant slope for
Craftsmen is surprising and difficult to explain. The positive slopes for 2
Year Schools and for "Other" activities are reasonable as explained earlier,
although they, are not significant. Youths who can't get jobs may take
additional vocational training or enter wait unemployment. They may
possibly go to 4 Year Colleges and Universities, although this is less
likely than vocational schools and junior colleges. Indeed, the slope for 4
Year Schools is negative, although also insignificant.
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Overall, the joint F-test shown at the bottom of Table IV is
significant (F-^.53) for all of the minimum wage terms. This indicates that
minimum wages do play an important role in choosing post-graduation
activities. However, the underlying mechanism is complex and not easily
summarized by the reported slopes.
The reader will recall that the minimum wage variable (MW^ -
was treated specially for Professional/Managers, 2 Year and 4 Year Schools,
and "Other" categories. Rather than setting MW£ = 0 for these four cases,
MM. was set equal to the nationwide minimum wage index. This was the index
used in the Table IV regressions. We tested the sensitivity of our results
by replicating Table IV but replacing MW. with 0 for these four categories
only. Not surprisingly, the results did not change much for the four
occupations for which there was no change in the minimum wage index. For
Professional/Managers, the slope became more negative and significant at the
10% level. For 2 Year Schools, the (H*MW) interaction became negative but
insignificant while the slope became slightly negative. Likewise the slope
for the "other" category became negative but insignificant. The slope for 4
Year Colleges became slightly more negative. These results are consistent
with those of Table IV in the sense that the expected slope is negative when
using whenever a positive sign is expected for We
place more confidence in the Table IV results in that zero
1951-1966 and nearly zero 1967-1969.
Although the results in Table IV are quite strong, we weVe concerned
that they may have been clouded by intercorrelation between home inputs and
school quality, due to the large number of interaction terms. In order to
test this, we reestimated (11) without the home input variables and without
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the school quality variable. Tlie results from the former regressions were
nearly identical to those in Table IV and are not reported to conserve
space. The only significant difference was that the t-ratios with respect
to school quality (S) generally increased in magnitude and were
statistically significant in all eight equations. This supports our
hypothesis that assets and school quality are competing with each other for
explanatory power.
The results obtained by deleting the school quality variable are
reported in Table V. Tlie results are extremely strong. The second moment
slope has the expected negative sign and is statistically significant all
eight times. The slope with respect to mean income is positive and
statistically significant all eight times. The home input slope is positive
and statistically significant in all cases except crafts. The F-tests over
all equations reconfirm that means, second moments, and assets each have
significant impacts on choice of activity. This formulation provides even
stronger support for the hypothesis that uncertainty matters and that agents
are risk averse.
A comparison of,the minimum wage (MW) coefficients between Tables IV
and V reveals that, in most cases, the magnitudes of the coefficients
diminish and that two categories (Crafts and Other) switch sign, although
remain insignificant. In all eight cases, the interaction term (II*MW) is
positive, as expected, and is significant five times. This reinforces our
previous conclusion that youths from higher income counties find it easier
to enter all categories when the minimum wage rises.
There were some changes in the minimum wage slopes, however. The most
important change is that the slope for 2 Year Schools increases in positive
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magnitude and becomes significant. This supports our hypothesis that youths
enter vocational and other schools when minimum wages rise as a strategy to
(1) enhance their human capital and (2) to wait for jobs to become available
in Che covered sector. On the other hand, there is no evidence that minimum
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wages increase A Year College enrollments.
The minimum wage slope and associated t-ratio increase in magnitude for
the "Other" group, although remaining insignificant. Although still weak
evidence, it is consistent with our expectations for this group of young men
who remain at home and who, in our view, are primarily unemployed.
Craftsmen continue to have a positive and significant coefficient.
There is the possibility that some youths may find it easier to take
positions as apprentices or learners relative to other jobs when the law is
revised, 'The Fair Labor Standards Act has continously provided a
certification program under which "learners in occupations involving enough
skill to necessitate an appreciable training period may be paid subminimum
rates." Generally they have been paid 85% of the normal rate. Indeed, the
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (1970) reported that. "Temporary increases
in the number of certificates and learners authorized have occurred at the
end of the fiscal year coincident with the effective dates of increases in
the minimum wage to $1 in 1956, $1,15 in 1961, and $1,25 in 1963. No
similar spurts occurred in 1967 and 1968 following the $1.40 and SI.60
rates," On the other hand, this BLS report indicates that the numbers
involved were small, varying from 21,000 to 73,000 nationally. Of course,
it is also possible that non-compliance with the law may be significant
among apprentices and learners in the crafts area. Apprentices may feel
that the law is not applicable or may be more willing to overlook it in
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return for the training. We do not claim that this explains all of our
results for Craftsmen, briit it may contribute to the large positive slope.
The other four occupational categories continue to have insignificant
minimum wage slopes, although three switch from negative to positive. Once
again, we interpret this as an indication that the minimum wage had little
adverse impact on high school graduate employment in Maryland. High school
dropouts may have been more likely to have experienced difficulty finding
jobs than graduates.
As before. Table V was rerun substituting for
for the Professional/Manager, 2 Year and 4 Year Schools, and the "Other"
category. This caused the Operative/Laborer and "Other" minimum wage slopes
to switch from positive to negative, although remaining insignificant. The
slope for 2 Year Schools remained positive but lost significance.
•Several additional tests of the sensitivity of our results were run.
None of these have caused us to alter our conclusions. We reran Tables IV
and V substituting a minimum wage index which eliminated all coverage
effects. This index focuses on the ratio of the minimum wage to average
industry wage rates,. Because it rises with Congressionally amended rates
and falls in other years due to inflation, this series eliminated much of
the upward trend which is associated with the expanded coverage of 1961,
1967, and 1969. The resulting series was less highly correlated with the
other explanatory variables. There was little impact on the minimum wage
slopes and coefHcients, however. If anything, the slopes were more likely
to be positive than those of Table IV, but insignificant.
Inclusion of both this "pure" minimum wage index and a separate
coverage variable, had slightly more interesting effects. The separate
MALES:
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TABLE V
ZELLNER REGRESSIONS CONTROLLING FOR INCOME MOMENTS, ASSETS, AND MINIMUM WAGES
Profes
sionals Clerical Operatives 1-3 4
and and . and Year Year
Managers Sales ICraftsmen Laborers Services Schools Schools Others
CPi-Pp) 1.53 3.00 14.46 5.97 -1.38 2.91 -4.85 19.14
. ^ !•
(.23) (.89) (3.56)***(1.64) (.18) (1.54) (4.01)*** (4.02)***
H*(M;-Mp) 5.20 1.62 .72 .18 6.62 .90 4.26 -4.18
JU L
(2.07)** (1.55) (.53) (.12) (1.89)* (1.41) (7.17)*** (2.60)***
(a:-Op) -2.90 -5.07 -8.08 -8.60 3.74 -19.23 -.32 •15.26
X c
(.59 (1.28) (1.64) (2.22)** (.52) (5.18)*** (.30) (3.34)***
H*(ai-ap) -1.44 .41 -2.76 3.56 -6.68 14.00 .79 4.67
X C
(.72) (.13) (.74) (1.35 (1.50) (3.91)*** (1.07) (2.03)**
H2*(a£-(Jp) -.37 .07 .61 -.62 .62 -2.92 -.73 -.28
(1.21) (.09) (.79) (1.33) (.91) (3.53)*** (4.83)*** (i.n?)
(MW.-MW„) -5.08 -2.53 1.00 -5.76 -6.95 -5.01 -6.81 -.13
^ JL C
k' -
(1.11) (1.12) (.35) (2,97)*** (1.64) (1.93)* (4.75)*** (.04)
H*(MW.-MW^) - -2.99 1.79 1.55 3.24 4.60 4.49 3.62 1.18
^ s.
t.
(1.51) (1.98)** (1.41) (4.57)*** (2.70)*** (5.09)** (6.29)*** (.80)
County Dummies Inc. Inc, Inc. Inc, Inc. Inc. Inc. Inc.
Intercept -5.31 -2.23 -5.20 -1.53 -3.96 -2.95 -.91 .92
(6.60)***(6.05)***(9.39)***(3.82)*** (9.85)*** (8.32)*** (4.03)*** (.85)
Estimated Derivatives:
3Z
8Z
9Z
TTT
3 Z
TOIW.-MW„)
1 r
11.26 6.03 15.81 6,31 11.00 4.59 3.10
(2.76)***(2.84)***(6.19)***(3.34)*** (3.69)*** (4.35)*** (5.24)***
-7.07 -4.04 -10.86 -4.37 -6.32 -4.54 -1.73
(2.79)***(2.41)***(5.53)***(3.27)*** (3.19)*** (5.36)*** (4.44)***
1.26 .72 .41 .80 1.19 1.33 1.47
(6.17)***(4.38)***(1.92)* (4.75)** (3.61)*** (7.12)***(18,78)***
.50 .82 3.90 .29 1.64
(.27) (.86) (3.26)*** (.34) (1.03)
3.38 -.04
(2.67)*** (.07)
Joint Summary Statistics:
Weighted R = .520
F-test for (nj^-|ip)
F-test for (a£-ffp)
8.22***
5.72***
F-test for H 13.41***
F-teet for (MW^-MWp) 6.94***
11.31
(2.65)***
-7.64
(2.45)***
1.20
(5.59)***
2.08
(1.39)
D.ependent variable: Z = log odds of selecting activity i over farming,
(t-statistics in parentheses)
^Significant at 10% level **Significant at 5% level ***Significant at 1%
level
f .
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coverage variable had positive and significant coefficients for 2 Year and 4
Year schools and for "Other" persons as expected. Four of the five
occupations also had positive coefficients although only one was significant
(Services). The "pure" minimum wage index was more likely to be negative or
closer to zero in this specification,
B. On-the-Job Training Effects
In all of the previous estimatesj we have ignored the On-The-Job
Training (OJT) aspects of the model. In this section, OJT is reintroduced
into our model by including the minimum wage (M) as a variable in the human
capital equation (h = 6^ +6 S+ 62 M) replacing home inputs (lO. We
substituted M for H, rather than adding a third variable, because of the
large numter of interaction terms which result from including three terms in
the human capital equation. Previous experience has indicated that
collinearity becomes a severe problem when we have so many interactions;
indeed, in several experiments the matrix would not invert.
This minimum wage variable (M) is the group's own minimum wage index
and is not net of the farm minimum wage. We interpret "M" as controlling
for the On-The-Job Training implications of the law. In particular, an
increase in M should reduce training opportunities in the four occupations
(Clerical/Sales; Crafts; Operatives/Laborers; Service) which are covered.
We expect no OJT effect for the other four categories
(professional/Managers; 2 Year and 4 Year Schools; "Other"), so
h = 6q S in these cases. No interaction terms involving Mare
included. All eight equations include two additional terms (MW and S*MW) as
were included in Table IV. We refer to these as the Queuing effects, as
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TABLE VI
MALES: ZELLNER REGRESSIONS CONTROLLING FOR INCOME MOMENTS, SCHOOL QUALITY, AND
MINIMUM WAGES (BOTH QUEUE AND ON-TME-JOB EFFECTS)
Profess
ionals
and
Managers
Clerical
and
Sales
Operatives
and
Craftsmen Laborers Service
1-3
Year
Schools
4
Year
Schools Others
(Mi-Pp) 18.2
(1.57)
11.9
(1.25)
5.63
(.32)
-5.19
(.40
-33.8
(1.80)
8.07
(2.61)**
.17
(.07)
30.81
(4.17)**
(S)*(Ui-MF) -.03
(.79)
-.02
(.53)
.014
(.24)
.03
(.51)
.20
(1.72)*
-.01
(1.36)
.01
(.75)
-.08
(3.99)**
M(pi-Jip)
—
-1.49
(.08)
3.03
(.11)
-1.56
(.08)
-10.9
(.10)
—
—
—
(a-Op) -9.00
(1.05)
-28.8
(1.37)
.78
(.02)
28.4
(.66)*
37.4
(1.65)*
-35.46
(4.11)***
-1.85
(.84)
-36.65
(3.28)***
S*(0£-0p)
: .
-.003
(.12)
.17
(1.60)
-.007
(.04)
-.08
(.63)
-.18
(1.43)
.21
(3.50)
-.005
(.46)
.14
(3.08)**
(S)24(0i-aj.) .
t . '
.7x10"
(1.44)
"^-2.1x10"
(.91)
^ -.9x10"
(.37)
.1x10"
(.06)
:9xlO'
(.57)
"^-3.3x10"^
(3.08)
.1x10"^
(.06)
-1.0x10"^
(2.24)**
M(a£-ap)
—
-25.5
(.25)
7.87
(.04)
-90.
(.53)
-77.
(1.19)
—
—
—
M^*(a£-ap) — 226.
(1.21)
-6.74
(.02)
60.
(.25)
136.
(1.02)
—
—
—
(S)*MA(oi-ap) — -.20
(.65)
-.19
(.35)
.17
(.50)
.09
(.38)
—
—
—
(MW^-MWp) -11.41
(1.55)
-13.37
(1.41)
5.75
(.47)
-7.54
(.91)
.76
(.05)
-11.76
(2.71)***
-8.72
(3.31)***
-.017
(.00)
(S)*(MWi-MWp) .04
(1.54)
.04
(1.54)
.01
(.30),
.03
(1.17)
.004
(.09)
.05
(4.58)***
.03 .002
(4.27)*** (.09)
County Dummies Inc. Inc, Inc. Inc. Inc, Inc. Inc, Inc.
Intercept -4.37 ' -1.03 -5.08 .13 -3.12 -1.39 .27 2.53
(5.39)***(1.37) (4.45)*** (.15) (4.33)***(2.59)*** (.98) (2,07)**
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TABLE VI (Continued)
MALES: ZELLNER REGRESSIONS CONTROLLING FOR INCOME MOMENTS, SCHOOL QUALITY, AND
MINIMUM WAGES (BOTH QUEUE AND ON-TIIE-JOB EFFECTS)
Profes-
sionals Clerical Operatives
and and and
Managers Sales Craftsmen Laborers Service
Esjimated Derivatives:
1-3 4
Year Year
Schools Schools Others
10.41 7.28 9.90 1.47
(1.78)AA (1.87)** (.37)
14.52 5.17 1.98 10.33
(1.91) (3.31)*** (2.94)*** (2.03)**
8Z
7Tap=ap"
dz
7m
-5.33 -4.71
(1.97)** (1.30)
.62
(.23)
-7.10 .80
(1.46)*** (.91)
-1.41
(.43)
-1.56
(.68)
-5.53 -4.46 -.48
(.96) (3.53)*** (1.00)
-1.83
(.61)
-7.20
(1.72)**
az
yCsT .0105 .0091 .0042
(5.73)***(4.61)***(1.49)
.0091 .0093 .0127 .0111 .0117
(4.34)***(2.55)***(6.44)***(17.14)*** (4.89)***
*9 Z
TOWi-MWj.) -1.52 -2.74 8.47 -.50 1.80 .97 -.20 .48
(.71) (.94) (2.37)** (.20) (.51) (.54) (.23) (.24)
Joint Summary Statistics:
Weighted R^ = .534
F-test for (pj^-pp)
F-test for (a^-Op)
F-test for M
F-test for S
F-test for (MVJ^-MWj.)
2.57***
2.85***
3.01***
14.35***
5.69***
Dependent variable: Z = log odds of selecting activity i over farming,
(t-statistics in parentheses)
* significant at 10% level
** significant at.5% level
*** significant at 1% level
t •
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opposed.to the OJT effects of the law. Of course, there is a question as to
whether our data will allow us to disentangle these two effects, in
practice.
Our regression estimates are presented in Table VI. The data and
estimation methods are identical to those of Table IV except for the
substitution of M or 0 for H and except for dropping the (M*MW) term which
would have introduced even more collinearity. The signs and magnitudes of
the Mean, Second Moment, and School Quality slopes are very similar in
Tables IV and VI. There is loss of significance in Table VI, particularly
for the second moments for Crafts and Clerical occupations. Joint
F-statistics, however, increase in value.
Our primary interest is in the minimum wage effects. First comparing
the queuing effects (9Z/8MW), we see a great deal of similarity between
Tables IV and VI. All signs and significance tests are identical, although
magnitudes change slightly. Nothing here causes us to modify our earlier
conclusions. We expected the OJT effects 0Z/8M) to be negative and three
of four terms are negative. However, none of the slopes are close to
conventional levels of significance individually. The joint F-test is
significant at the 1% level over all terms involving M,
We ran some additional sensitivity tests of our model. First, we reran
Table VI dropping the (S*MW) variable from all eight equations. This tended
to reduce the collinearity problem and raise t-ratios. In particular, the
Queuing coefficient on the remaining MW variable became positive and
significant for 2 Year and 4 Year Schools, in addition to Craftsmen, In
addition, all four OJT slopes (9Z/9m) were negative as expected, including
Clerical/Sales,
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Although not conclusive, we take this as evidence that the impact of
the niinimuni wage on choice of activity is complex. Entry of high school
graduates into occupations may have been reduced by the OJT effect but
increased by the queuing effect.
Zellner "Seemingly Unrelated" Regressions for Females
similar regression estimates were made for women. Some modifications
had to be made due to data limitations. First, there are relatively few
women in certain occupations (Crafts; Farming), so the number of
22 •
occupational activities dropped from six to four. Second, this
necessitated changing the reference group from Farming to Clerical/Sales,
Third, we did construct Income Means and Second Moments for females, using
methodology similar to males. Unfortunately, such data for females are of
questionable usefulness. The major problem is that income is reported over
all women, including part-time and part-year workers. As a result, year to
year variation as well as long-term trends may reflect changes in hours
worked by women, rather than changes in the unit value of their human
capital. We did attempt to adjust for changes in the average weeks worked
23 •
per year, but with limited success. As a consequence, we substituted the
male income moments which yielded somewhat more consistent results than the
female income moments. This difficulty suggests that less confidence should
be placed on the female results. Nevertheless, we do believe that we can
draw a few interesting, if tentative, conclusions. Table VII provides means
and standard deviations of the variables.
Table VIII reports our Zellner regression estimates for the full model
which includes both school quality (S) and home inputs (H). The estimated
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TABLE VII
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR FEMALES
Dependent Variable: LogCP^/PQ)
Professionals/Manager8
Operatives/Laborers/Crafts
Service
1-3 Year Schools
4 Year Schools
Other (Unemployed)
Differences in Income Means
_ Professionals/Managers
Operatives/L^borers/Crafts
Service
1-3 Year Schools
4 Year Schools
Other (Unemployed)
Differences in Income Second Moments (<^£**0(1)
Mean
-A. 829
-2.515
-1.739
-.962
-.292
-.331
,246
,119
,236
036
,155
,768
Profjessionals/Managers
Operatives/Laborers/Crafts
Service
1-3 Year Schools
4 Year Schools
Other (Unemployed)
School Quality (S)
Assets (H)
Miniumum Wage Index (MW^-MWj^)
Professional/Managers
Operative/Laborers/Crafts
Service
1-3 Year Schools
4 Year Schools
Other (Unemployment)
.473
-.183
-.262
-.046
.259
-.510
254.549
1.872
.024
.085
.057
.024,
,024
,024
Standard Deviation
1.430
1.678
.782
.722
.641
.570
.034
.023
.035
.086
.095
.089
.066
.052
.070
.046
.150
.115
67.588
.659
.021
.028
.020
.021
.021
.021
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derivatives are less consistent in terms of sign and significance in
contrast with the results for males (see Table IV). Four of six means are
positive as expected but none are significant, while one half of the second
moment slopes are negative (none significant). Although we primarily found
positive schooling and home input slopes for males, three of these slopes
are negative and significant for females. On a more positive note, women in
higher quality schools are more likely to go on to four—year colleges.
The most consistent and significant derivatives occur for the Minimum
Wage variable. It is interesting that all six slopes are negative and three
are significant. This suggests that female high school graduates may have
been hurt more by minimum wages than their male counterparts. The negative
slopes for the two school groups could be interpreted as implying that women
face (financial) barriers to using additional education as a means of
overcoming the minimum wage constraint. It is less clear to us why the data
suggest that women have flowed into Clerical/Sales jobs rather than home
activities (included in "Other"),
The individual Minimum Wage coefficients are similar to those estimated
for males in that MW is negative in all cases (and significant three times)
while the interaction terms with S and H are positive in general. The
positive interaction with School Quality (S) is particularly notable being
positive in all five cases where we expect a positive sign and being
significant in three of those cases. Like tl\e males, female graduates of
higher quality schools do better than graduates of lower quality schools in
the face of rising Minimum Wages,
In Table IX, we reestimate the model deleting the School Quality
variable. Even more than for males, this improves the estimated derivatives
Females!
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. TABLE VIII
Zellner Regreflsions Controlling £or Income
School Quality and Home Inputs
Professional
and
Operatives,
Laborers,
and Crafts Services
1-3
Year
Schools
(Mi-yc> -21.6(.94)
16.1
(.36)
29.9
(1.95)*
4.45
(1.36)
S*(vii-Mc^ .13
(.93)
-.002
(.01)
-.12
(2.10)**
-.03
(2.37)**
H*(Pi-i>C^ " -5.94
(.44)
-8.97
(.64)
2.26
(.48)
.98
(1.23)
(Oi-Oc) 16.53
(1.37)
-6,73
(.21)
-23.3
(1.34)
11.72
(1.64)
S*((Ji^-ac)
4
-s2*(oj^-a(,)
-.10
(1.32)
.0x4x10 ^
. (.04)
-.05
(.28)
2.0x10"^
(1.10)
.05
(.59)
.9x10"^
(.95)
-.03
(.50)
.9x10"'^
(.59)
U*(ai-(Jc) 1.04
(.13)
9.30
(.79)
3.80
(.62)
-6.38
(1.20)
H^*(aj^-a(,) -.33
(.45)
.84
(.90)
- -.03
(.07)
.16
(.19)
8*11* (a ^-Oq) .014
(1.25)
-.028
(1.48)
-.012
(1.41)
.007
(.38)
(MWi-MCc) -52.8
(1.55)
-9.59
(.69)
-28.5
(2.09)**
-30.9
(4.14)***
S*(MWi^-MWc) .12
(.76)
.009
(.12)
.11
(2.11)**
.10
(2.62)***
H*(MWi^-MWc) 8.99
(.91)
-2.44
(.44)
-1.97
(.57)
.11
(.04)
County Dummies Inc. 1**^.
Intercept -3.75
Inc.
-1.04
Inc.
-.11
(.71)
Moments,
4+
Year
Schools
2.42
(.83)
-.01
(.85)
1.06
(.78)
.08
(.03)
.003
(.20)
.1x10
(.37)
-1.18
(1.33)
.15
(.88)
Other
9.02
(2.43)**
-.06
(3.88)***
4.21
(2.82)***
-16.23
(3.66)***
.11
(4.20)***
,-4 -.6x10"^
(2.75)***
-5.57
(2.18)**
-.29
(2.42)**
.0002
(.06)
-35.1
(6.05)***
.10
(3.23)***
1.33
(.64)
Inc.
.08
(.68)
.005
(2.03)**
-4.21
(.46)
-.02
(.48)
4.27
(1.31)
Inc.
.61
(.66)
A1
TABLE VIII (Continued)
Females: Zellner Regressions Controlling for Income Moments,
School Quality and Home Inputs
Professional
and
Managerial
Operatives, 1-3
Laborers, Year
and Crafts Services Schools
Year
Schools Other
Estimated Derivatives
8Z
3Z
-P-
8Z
TS"
8 Z
.64 -1.32 3.89 -.99 .72 1.22
(.09) (.11) (.56) (1.17) (0.92) (.44)
-1.83 .28 -3.43 31.7 -.02 1.59
(.44) (.03) (.74) (1.65)* (.05) (.63)
.55 -.49 -.78 1.48 .13 -.35
(1.31) (.72) (2.37)** (.88) (1.57) (2.36)*
-.0006 .0009 -.0037 -.0021 .0023 .0019
(.16) (.22) (1.17) (2.56)** (3.65)** (1.59)
-5.71 -11.87 -3.24 -5.09 -7.73 -1.73
(.94) (2.17)** (1.00) (2.85)*** (6.45)*** (.89)
«.Joint Summary Statistics:
Weighted = ,599
F-test for (P£-Pq)
F-test for (o^-ap)
F-test for H
F-teet for S
F-test for (MW^-MWq)
2.54***
1,99***
1,90***
2.33***
Dependent variables:
Z = Log odds of selectiving occupation i over Clerical/Sales
(t-statistics in parentheses)
* Significant at 10% level
** Significant at 5% level
*** Significant at 1% level
42
TABLE IX
Females: Zellner Regressions Controlling for
Professional Operatives, 1-3 4+
and Laborers, Year Year
Managerial and Crafts Services Schools Schools Other
(Vi-Pc) -11.54 13.99 14.58 -1.74 -.15 3.42
•
(.69) (.74) (2.17)** (1.13) (.08) (1.16)
H*(yi-P(,) 6.22 -4.92 -3.70 .08 .86 -1.08
(.64) (.46) (1.32) (.12) (.88) (1.16)
(Oi-Oc) 6.46 -10.18 -12.06 10.31 .86 -7.08
(.71) (.79) (1.82)* (2.54)** (.76) (2.27)**
-6.07 3.21 4.13 -6.49 -1.04 3.66
(1.07) (.40) (1.14) (2.02)** (1.46) (2.53)**
.75 -.11 -.24 .88 .19 -.41
(1.80)* (.14) (.68) (1.42) (1.70) (4.36)***
(MW^-MWq) -26.96 -2.89 -10.13 -20.70 -21.81 -3.04
(1.84)* (.33) (1.72)* (4,99)*** (7.89)*** (.63)
H*(MWi-MWQ) 12.21 ' -3.19 4.23 ' 6.17 6.41 .56
♦ . (1.65)* (.80) (1.66)* (2.78)*** (4.15)*** (.23)
County Dummies Inc. Inc. Inc. Inc. Inc. Inc.
Intercept -4.13 -1.42 -1.00 -.21 -.14 .34
(6.12)*** (2.24)** (2.22)** (1.57) (1.46) (.38)
Estimated Derivatives:
3Z
az
TiT
3z
.11
(.02)
-1.95
(.61)
.59
(2.48)**
4.10
(.89)
4.79
(.65)
-4.61
(.61)
-.24
(.48)
-8.87
(2.03)**
7.64
(1.94)**
-5.30
(2.20)**
-.52
(2.01)**
-2.22
(1.21)
-1.59
(2.86)***
1.62
(1.94)**
.68
(2.29)**
-9.16
(6.38)***
1.46
(2.45)***
-.31
(.86)
.30
(5.19)***
-9.82
(10.46)***
1.40
(.52)
-1.86
(.78)
-1.13
(3.13)***
-2.00
(1.04)
Joint Summary Statistics:
Weighted-R^ = -.584
F-test for (p^-pj.) 2.18***
F-test for (^£-0^) 2.27***
F-test for H 3.72***
, F-test for MM 16.79***
Depentent Variables: Z - Log odds of selecting occupation i over Clerical/Sales
It-statistics in parentheses)
^significant at 10% level **Significant at 5% level ***Signifleant at 1% level
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for means and second moments. The mean is positive Eive of six times and
significant in two cases. It is difficult to explain the negative,
significant result for 1-3 year schools. The second moment is negative five
of six times, with -1-3 year schools as the exception, once again. The
derivative with respect to home inputs remains mixed, with three positive
signs (all significant) and three negative signs (two significant).
The Minimum Wage variable has similar effects in Tables VIII and IX.
overall, women appear to be hurt by minimum wages although this is less true
for women from more wealthy communities.
Structural Estimates
In order the summarize the information contained in the previous
tables, it'is useful to obtain estimates of the structural parameters. Sg..
, Ti and n The full model outlined in equations (7),
ii' 2i*" 3i' Oi li
es). and (9) would have 50 parameters with nine activities. Given the
complication of estimating such a large model using maximum likelihood
methods, we impose some further restrictions on the system. We impose that
the higher skill occupations (professional, crafts, and clerical) have the
same structural parameters. Similarly, the lower skill occupation (service;
farming, fishing and lumbering; and operatives and laborers) have the same
structural parameters. Finally, we reduce the complexity of the human
capital production function by restricting the household asset effect,
to zero. These restrictions reduce the number of structural parameters to
20. We have 10 production parameters, 6gj, Sql' ^IJ' ®1C' ®1H'
6,6, and 6 where the subscripts are J = junior college or vocational
• IL 3U 3L
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school, C = four year college, H = high skill jobs and L = low skill jobs.
62^ represents the on-the-job training effects which applies only to the
high skill clerical and craft occupations and to the low skill occupations.
We cannot obtain the production coefficients for the unemployed (U) group.
kSince earnings for this group are zero, E(Wy) = 0 for all k which means that
the terms 6^^ and 6 fall out of the equation.
We have 10 queuing parameters, tTq^,
IT. , and n,-. The vector H-. gives the level effect of the minimum wage on
IH JLLi UX
the length of queue and represents the effect of school quality on the
minimum wage effect. By inserting (9) into (7), we see that a positive
(negative) sign on these parameters will imply an increased (decreased)
length of queue and a lower (higher) probability of entry into the
activity.*
The estimates are reported in Table X. The results are generally
consistent with those reported in the unconstrained estimation—increasing
school quality increases activies—specific human capital for junior
college, college and high skill occupations but lowers human capital for low
skill occupations. Therefore, increasing school quality lowers entry into
the low skill occupations as it increases entry into the other activities.
These parameters imply that the level of human capital embodied in
entrants into the high skill occupations is higher than that of entrants
into the low skill occupations. Consistent with this finding is the result
that increasing the minimum wage further increases the human capital of the
entrants into the high skill occupations (presumably by increasing the
availability of on—the—job training) but it decreases the human capital of
k5
entrants into low skill occupations. The interpretation is that the
negative impacts of minimum wages on on-the-job training are concentrated in
the lower skill occupations whereas increasing minimum wages will actually
increase training opportunities for higher skilled individuals in high skill
occupations.
In looking at the queuing coefficients, we find that minimum wages
increase the incentives to go to junior college or vocational school, but
reduce the incentives to go to college or to high or low skill occupations.
Contrary to expectations, increasing the minimum wages appears to reduce the
number going into the unemployed and 'other' activity as well. Increasing
school quality acts to reverse all these affects. As school generated human
capital increases, the queue for high and low skill jobs is reduced and the
incentives to attend four year rather than two year colleges increases.
Once again, the anomoly is that a higher level of school quality appears to
increase entry into the unemployed and other activity. However, taken as a
whole, these results indicate that increasing the minimum wage does affect
queues for jobs—increasing queues for people from poorer schools and
reducing queues for those from higher quality schools. These results,
coupled with those above for the on-the-job training effects, point to a
compelling explanation for the frequent finding of differential impacts of
minimum wages across the different demographic groups. Variation in average
levels of embodied, human capital across demographic groups may well explain
the variation in the direction and magnitude of the effects of minimum wages
on employment and on—this—job training of those demographic groups.
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TABLE X
Maximum Likelihood Estimates of the Structural Equations (7-9)
^OJ -11.80
^oc -2.58
1.54
^OL 6.56
«1J 5.66
1.61
2.53
-2.55
^311 12.62
®3L -19.65
'^ OU 2.68
^OJ -6.51
^OC 2.51
"oil 7.67
'^ OL 7.89
"lU -1.80
1.42
'^ IG -1.65
"iH -4.37
"iL -5.40
Likelihood
Value -4165.51
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Summary
Our major objective in this study has been to analyze the impact
of minimum wages on the choice of activity of youths following high school
graduation. There has been little previous research in this area. As such,
our results must be interpreted as preliminary but suggestive.
One interesting finding is that the impact of the minimum wage law
varies with the quality of schooling and home inputs. Graduates of better
high schools, having more human capital, find it easier to take jobs when
the minimum rises. Graduates of lower quality high schools have a more
difficult time finding non-agriculture jobs. Although our data set excludes
them, by inference high school dropouts also suffer as the minimum rises.
A second important result is that junior college and vocation school
enrollments increase in response to higher minimum wages and coverage. This
may be interpreted as being due to youths attempting to increase their human
capital so as to surpass the minimum wage barrier or as a place to wait for
acceptable jobs to become available. We find less evidence of an effect of
minimum wages on entry into 4 Year Colleges and Universities, Tliere is
somewhat more evidence that minimum wages induce more youths to remain at
home and undertake other non-employment, non-schooling activities (such as
unemployed status),
Third, we find some support for the notion that the adverse effects of
minimum wages on On-The-Job Training reduce entry into the occupations in
our data set which were covered by the law. We found generally consistent
negative (but only marginally significant) impacts of reduced training
opportunities on occupational entry. The joint hypothesis of no effect
A8
u,.,.u,. « .1... l- '•™ •"•"• °°
..h„, .r..,.....- Th. OJT .».« r.d.„. .n.., !»« .U. -H.!-
th. .H.« I""—" ""»• •'
quality in our sample.
0.r results suggest that future studies oE the mini™, wage should use
disaggregated data. The impact on young people varies with their
Thnflfi with more human capital may be inaccumulated level of human capital. Those
amore advantageous position while those with less human capital may be more
minimum wage effects across demographic groups. Future studies may also
profit by including further schooling as an alternative to employment. We
£ind evidence of increased enrollments in vocational schools and junior
colleges resulting from higher minimums.
- The policy implications are closely related to these observations. Our
results reinforce the findings of other studies. Youths from richer
families gain at the expense of youths from poorer families. «e extend this
by noting that youths from better schools also gain. In addition, we find
stronger evidence than do other studies of additional schooling as an
alternative to employment. If this schooling is productive, it will help to
minimize the losses of economic efficiency caused by aminimum wage law. On
the other hand, if schools are simply places to wait for job openings then
this strategy is no better than waiting at home.
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FOOTNOTES
1. See Brown, Gilroy, and Kohen (1982) for a review of the theory,
2, See Hashimoto (1981, 1982) or Leighton and Mincer (1982) for evidence
supporting this proposition.
3, - Cunningham (1981), Ehrenberg and Marcus (1980), and Mattila (1981) all
explore this question with different data sets. The results are not
consistent across the studies so no general conclusions may be drawn.
4. See Linneman (1982) for evidence of this hours adjustment.
3. See footnote 2.
6. This exponential utility form is commonly used in the empirical
literature oh asset choice. See Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) for a
review of the methodology,
7. More complex forms of the production function are admissible, although
the estimated activity choice equation becomes overburdened with
higher-order terms as more terms are added to the production equation.
8. Some might wonder if the Maryland data are representative of the United
States. The following comparison indicates that they are quite
similar. The Maryland figures are averages for high school graduates
over the period 1951-70. The U.S. data are averages for males 18-19
having exactly four years of high school in 1960 (U.S. Bureau of
Census, 1960 Census of Population, Educational Attainment^ Report
PC(2)-5B, Subject Reports, Table 8).
Maryland U.S.
Professionals & Managers .020 .058
Clerical & Sales .215 .251
Craftsmen .101 .120
Operatives & Laborers .426 .414
Service .041 .076
Farm & Farm Laborers .197 .081
1.000 1.000
The discrepancy for "farmers" may be due, in part, to the fact that the
classification scheme for Maryland includes fishing and lumbering in
addition to farming, whereas the U.S. classification is exclusively
farmers and farm laborers,
9. A seventh category in the published data is titled "Protective Service
Workers Including Armed Forces." A substantial number of young men are
in this classification, especially during the Korean War years and the
late 1950s. Some decline in the early 19603 and a rise in the late
1960s suggests that variation in this category is largely exogenous,
changing with national defense requirements and draft calls. Hence, we
exclude these men from our data set. Our employed population is best
interpreted as the employed civilian population.
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10. These zero observations were retained since they provide useful infor
mation about occupational choice and since deletion could cause sample
selection bias. Setting N « O.l in the expression LogCN/F), where F xs
the number of farmers and N is the number in occupation i, allows us to
maintain a relative ranking as compared to the case in which N- J-"
higher. Other specifications (e.g., setting N '^.Ol or N=.001) yielded
similar results. Correlations varied between .936 and .995 for
dependent variables utilizing these approximations. In Table III, the
only notable impact of changing Nto .001 was to eliminate the
significance of the asset derivatives for the craftsmen and service
occupations•
11. We considered other measures such as substituting "total school
expenditures" for "salaries and wages" and substituting the number oE
• students "attending" for the number "belonging . Each pair was so
hiehly correlated that this made little difference in the results. The
six-year average covers the junior high and high school years. The
measure is not greatly affected by varying the number of years in the
moving average.
12. Once again, this measure is not highly sensitive to varying assumptions
regarding the number of years in the moving average. The correlations
were .990 or higher among the 2,4, and 6 year moving averages.
13. For specifics, see Orazem and Mattila (1983). Identical methodology
was used in estimating means and second moments for school attainment.
14. Assume that the distributions of human capital (h) and earnings per
unit of human capital (W) are independent. If Wand h each have moment
generating functions, the joint moment generating function is M(W,h>
M(W,0)M(0,h) (see Hogg and Craig, p. 80). Tliis implies that
p^h and Oy the first two moments. Taking logarithms, we
get:
(i) In = In
and (ii) In = In Oj^ + In
Equation (i) stiggests regressing the observed values of In on the
observed values of In \i^ and then estimating Py as the anti-log of the
-residuals. This was our approach with the addition of an intercept,
which corresponds to the constant or slowly changing distribution of
age and experience within an occupation (see Orazem and Mattila (1983)
for more details).
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15. Data on earnings by occupations for high school graduates were
available for 1959 and 1969, providing the 1960'8 trend. Due to the
lack of directly comparable data for 1949, the 19A9-59 trend was^
established by analyzing changes in the income moment and education
attainment moments.
16. Additional detail on the adjustment process is available in Orazem and
Mattila (1983).
17. Coverage by industry 1951*'1960 was based on data published in the 1954
Annual Report of the U.S. Wage and Hour and Public Contract Divisions,
Industry coverage 1961—69 was based on data published in the Annual
Reports to Congress on Minimum Wage and Maximum Hour Standards Under
the FLSA. A major increase in coverage in Construction occurred in
T^6 due to court decisions which extended coverage beyond the 1953
interpretation of the U.S. Department of Labor. More minor adjustments
in coverage were made due to court rulings in Wliolesale Trade,
Services, and Finance during the 1950*8, In addition, care was taken
to eliminate workers phased into coverage during 1969 from those
covered during 1967. The published statistics for 1967 include both
groups. Some other minor inconsistencies in the published data for
Agriculture and for Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate were
rectified.
18. Once again, those phased into coverage in 1969 are separated out from
those^phased in under the 1967 amendments. We are grateful to Joyce
Cooper for supplying the unpublished FLSA coverage data by industry and
state for 1964. Similar data for 1967 was published in Minimum Wage
and Maximum Hours Standards Under FLSA, 1967,
' I
19. It may be hypothesized that these results are obtained merely because
rural areas have lower levels of assets and school quality, and thus
the probability of selecting farming is inversely related to S and H,
However, the county specific dummy variables should control for the
rural versus urban nature of a county school district. Thus, the
parameters on S and H should capture effects that are independent of
fixed county characteristics.
20. We should note at the outset that in Linneman's study of the
probability of membership in the subminimum population, the mean
educational attainment for the population above the minimum wage was
12.1. If this result carries over to Maryland, then we would expect
the average high school graduate would benefit from increases in the
minimum, especially those from higher quality schools or wealthy
families.
21. This may account for the mixed findings in the literature, Mattila,
using time series data, found that minimum wages significantly
increased school enrollments in his 1979 paper, but found no
significant impact on school enrollments in his 1982 paper. Ehrenberg
and Marcus and also Cunningham find mixed results using cross-section
data. We believe that our tests are more powerful in that (a) we can
separate 2 Year School enrollments from 4 Year colleges and (b) we have
combined time-series and cross-section data. Cross-section data alone
miss the impacts of changes in the law. Aggregate time-series data may
hide real effects which are more apparent using disaggregated data.
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22. The four groups are (1) Professional and Managers, (2) Clerical and
Sales, (3) Service (including private household workers) and Ch;
Operatives, Laborers, Crafts, and Farming.
23. Distributions of workers are available by sex and occupation for weeks
workers per year and for full-time and part-time workers from the
annual U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, "Work Experience surveys.
Using fixed hours worked per week weights and weeks worked mid points
within~il^ category, we computed the mean and second moment of work
weeks per year by occupation. These variables were then added to the
regression equation in which we "purged" income of changes due to weeks
worked as well as education. See footnote 14 above.
24. These estimates use the overall average minimum wage index for the
college, junior college and vocational school, professional and
managerial, and 'other' groups. The occupation-specific minimum wage
indices are used for the remaining groups.
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